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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY FIRE FIGHTERS LO-
CAL 1645, AFL-CIO, FEDERATED FIRE 
FIGHTERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE CITY POLICE UNION LO-
CAL 470, AFL-CIO, SALT LAKE CITY 
POLICE MUTUAL AID ASSOCIATION, 
SALT LAKE CITY EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 
1004, AFL-CIO, for and on behalf of their 
members, and JIM FISHER and DAVE 
BRADFORD for themselves and for and on 
behalf of all other persons similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11351 
Plaintiffs filed an action in the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County on behalf of themselves and 
all employees of Salt Lake City similarly situated pursuant 
to Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that 
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(a) the words "any or all appo'intivP officers" 
in Section 10-6-6 U. C. A. (1953) as amended by Laws 
of Utah 1955, ch. 12, § 1, did not include all employees 
of the city irrespective of their duties or the nature of 
their employment, and 
(b) that the Ordinances of the defendant Salt 
Lake City of January 9, 1968, requiring "appointive 
officers and employees" to reside within a "fifteen 
mile radius from Washington Square" (R. 13) and 
that portion of the city Ordinances, Sections 30-1-10, 
14-1-5, 17-3-5 (R. 14) prohibiting any political activity 
of any kind by health, fire or police employees, were 
void as being unconstitutional and beyond the powers 
of Respondent. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court, Judge Wilkins, without expressly 
ruling on any of the issues before the Court, entered an 
Order dated July 10, 1968, dismissing plaintiffs' Amended 
Complain as failing "to state a cause of action" (R. 17-18). 
Plaintiffs are appealing herein from said final Order. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This Appeal seeks to have this Court grant the declar-
atoy relief sought by plaintiffs-appellants and which was 
avoided and denied by the District Court, and reverse the 
judgment of the District Court for errors of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The City adopted an Ordinance in early January, 1968, 
(f:. 13) requiring all of its employees to remove their resi-
dences within "a 15 mile radius of Washington Square" 
within two years or face discharge. Many employees reside 
outside of the designated area in so-called "bedroom com-
munities" abutting the irregular boundaries of the City 
(Exhibits 1 and 5). The City is served by a new and ex-
tensive system of freeways running through the City and 
adjacent areas where these employees reside (Map, Ex-
hibit 1). 
The City some years ago adopted three Ordinances (R. 
14) prohibiting certain political activities by all employees 
of the health, fire and police departments of the City. The 
City interprets and enforces these Ordinances as prohibit-
ing any political participation of any kind, even in non-
partisan elections, by these employees (R. 32; Exhibit 4). 
These Ordinances affect a large number of City employees 
(Exhibit 5). 
No evidence or argument was advanced by the City 
presenting, nor do the ordinances themselves present, any 
reason, advantage, rationale or purpose for the Ordinances. 
Thus, in the contert of the uncontroverted eviJence pre-
sented by plaintiffs, the Ordinances must be interpreted 
as self-justifying. 
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POINT I. 
THE ORDINANCE RESPECTING THE RESI-
DENCE OF EMPLOYEES EXCEEDS THE 
STATUTORY POWERS OF RESPONDENT. 
The subject ordinance (R. 13) in substance and effect 
requires all employees to remove their residence within a 
"15 mile radius of Washington Square'' within 2 years or 
face discharge. Respondent admits that "many employees 
of defendant have been employed for numerous years and 
reside outside the boundaries of defendant" (R. 16). The 
ordinance includes all employees - whether police officer, 
groundskeeper, janitor. The ordinance itself sets forth 
no purpose, rationale or need. 
This Court has on a number of occasions enunciated 
the rule of limited powers of municipal corporations. This 
Court held, in Stephenson vs. S. L. City Corporation, 7 
Utah 2d 28, 30, 317 P. 2d 597, 599 (195'1) : 
"That the powers of the city are strictly limited 
to those expressly granted, to those necessarily or 
fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted, and to those essential to the declared ob· 
jects and purposes of the corporation, is settled law 
in this state." 
The Respondent offered no evidence or, indeed, any 
argument, justifying any need, real or imagined, for or 
any benefit to the City from, the subject ordinance. Two 
of the plaintiffs, men of long and distinguished service to 
Respondent in a variety of capacities, knew of no reason 
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or need for these ordinances ( R. 26-39) . The evidence ad-
duced - the addresses of the employees, the fact that many 
reside outside Salt Lake City and outside the 15 mile radius, 
the location of the freeway system in and adjacent to the 
city, the addresses where these employees work (Exhibits 
1, 2, 3 and 5) - establishes clearly that the ordinance \\as 
nobhing but a wholly arbitrary exercise of raw power by 
the City. The hardship to these employees - without any 
reason, need or benefit to the City - is also obvious. 
Respondent evidently claims to derive statutory power 
to adopt the subject residence ordinance from Section 
10-6-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That Statute reads: 
"Eligibility of officers - All elective officers 
of cities and of towns shall be chosen by the quali-
fied voters of their respective municipalities. No 
persons shall be eligible to any elective office who 
is not a qualified elector of the city or town, nor 
shall any person be eligible to any off ice who is a 
defaulter to thee orporation. The governing body of 
a mun:icipality may prescribe by ordinance thait any 
or all appoinfrve officers be qualified eleetors of the 
municipality." (Emphasis added.) 
The Stephenson case, cited supra, is also helpful in its 
holding that 
"* * * It is a common rule of construction 
that wherever possible each word in a statute must 
be given a meaning, and 'that construction is fa-
vored which will render every word operative, 
rather than one which makes some words idle and 
nugatory.' (Citing)" 7 Utah 2d 28, 31. 
ti 
Had the legislature meant to give Respondent the 
power to require that every employee of the city reside 
within the city, the legislature could have and presumably 
would have, used the simple word "employees" instead of 
the restrictive words "appointive officers." The ordinance 
itself completely bears out this distinction: the ordinancf' 
by its language covers "every appointive officer and em-
ployee." Clearly both the legislature and Respondent by 
employing the word "appointive officer" meant some-
thing different and, obviously, more restrictive than "em-
ployee." The fact that Section 10-6-6 is part of Article 1 
entitled "Governing Bodies" of the Municipal Government 
Code lends further support to Appellants' position that the 
Respondent's equating "appointive officers" with "all em-
ployees" cannot be supported. 
Furthermore, even according Section 16-6-6 U. C. A., 
1953, as amended, the construction argued for by Respon-
dent, that statute certainly does not empower Respondent 
to require that all employees reside within 15 miles of a 
particular point (Washington Square) within the city. As 
the city map (Exhibit 1) clearly shows, the 15 mile radius 
embraces a fair sized area outside Salt Lake City. 
POINT II. 
THE ORDINANCES PROHIBITING ANY PO-
LITICAL ACTIVITIES EXCEED THE STATU-
TORY POWERS OF RESPONDENT. 
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The subject ordinances relating separately to employ-
ees of the health, fire and police departments are identical 
in all respeots except as to the department covered (R. 14). 
The ordinances read (the italicized portion is the only pro-
hibition challenged by Appellants) : 
"Sec. 30-1-10. Political activity. No person of the 
classified civil service of the health lor fire or 
police] department shall use his official position or 
of any person, nor be a member or delegate or alter-
nate to any political convention, nor serve as a 
member of any committee of any political party, or 
take any active part in the management of any po-
litical campaign, nor solicit, collect, or receive any 
assessment, subscription, contribution or dues in-
tended or used for any political purpose whatso-
ever." 
Although the challenged portion of the subject ordin-
ances prohibits only certain specified political activilties, Re-
spondent construes and enforces the ordinances as meaning 
that "there can be no politioal activity" and "no action in 
a political sense" ( R. 32, lines 8-15) and as applicable to 
non-partisan elections as well (Par. 6, Exhibit 4). 
Here, too, neither the ordinances themselves suggest 
nor did Respondent at the time of hearing herein offer, 
any reason, need, rationale or benefit necessitating, justi-
fying or even supporting these ordinances and two long-
time employees of Respondent. plaintiffs herein, ·testified 
that they knew of none (R. 26-39). Far from establishing 
any "compelling public interest" (as required by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in the Bagley case, cited and quoted 
infra) or as having a "reasonable relation to the promo-
8 
tion of efficiency, integrity or discipline" within u 
affected departments (as required by the New JerS€y ~, 
preme Court in the De Stefano case cited and quoted infra 
the Respondent herein made no showing of any kind sur 
poding these ordinances. Nor are any of the constitution, 
standards laid down by the United States Supreme Cour 
in the Keyishian case, infra, met by the subject ord1: 
ances. 
POINT III. 
THE ORDINANCES OF RESPONDENT R& 
SPECTING THE RESIDENCE OF EMPLOY-
EES AND PROHIBITING ANY POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES BY EMPLOYEES ARE VIOLA-
TIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiffs hav,e set out in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 anu 
13 of their Amended Complaint (R. 5) what they believ1 
to be certain basic, fundamental, inalienable human righ~ 
with which they are by their creaitor endowed and whicr 
are expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of the Stati 
of Utah, and which are, appellants submit, violated by the 
subject ordinances. Among these provisions are Section: 
1 7 18 22 and 24 of Article I of the Constitution of th1 , ' , 
State of Utah. 
Certain of the employees of the City reside outside oi 
the City limits and others, outside of the arbitrary 15 milt 
radius (Map, Exhibit 1). The residence ordinance makei 
no provision for compensation if these modestly salariel 
s 
.. 
employees lose their equity in their homes in removing in-
side the specified area. The ordinance was adopted after 
these employees had established residence. The testimony 
of Officel' Bradford (R. 33-37) illustrates something of the 
ininstice, inequity, and hardships involved. 
The map of the City and County (Exhibit 1) and the 
location of the freeway system illustrates clearly that the 
ordinance has no relationship at all to the time involved in 
the employee's getting to work; in faot, the map makes 
obvious intrusions on basis constitutional rights might, in 
example, might well be able to reach "Washington Square" 
in far Jess time than an employee living in, say, Holladay, 
and within the 15 mile radius, could reach the same desti-
nation. 
Perhaps one could postulate a situation where such 
obvious intrusions on basis constitutional rights might, in 
balancing critical, imperative needs of the cilty against 
those of the employees, justify the subject ordinances. In 
arrogance of power, the City makes no attempt to claim 
or show any benefit to the city from this Ordinance; rnther 
the ordinance is simply promulgated ex cathedra. 
In United States vs. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315-316, 90 
L. Ed. 1252, 1259-1260 ( 1946), laws denying a livelihood 
are held to be included within the proscriptions of ex post 
faC'to laws and bills of a;ttainder, and the constitutional 
requisites of laws impinging rights of public employees are 
spelled out definitively in Keyi.c;hia.n vs. Bd. of Regents of 
University of New York, 385 U. S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 
L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). See also, Landes vs. Town of North 
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Hempstead, 36 U. S. Law Week 2313 (N. Y. Ct. of App, 
1967), and Vogel vs. County of Los Angeles, 64 Cal. Rep. 
-109 (Dec., 1967). 
POINT IV. 
THE ORDINANCES OF RESPONDENT RE-
SPECTING THE RESIDENCE OF EMPLOY-
EES AND PROHIBITING ANY POLITICAL 
ACTIVITIES BY EMPLOYEES ARE VIOLA-
TIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES. 
The California Supreme Court in the landmark case 
of Bagley vs. Washington Hospital District, 421 P. 2d 409 
(1966), well staJted the problem (at page 417) : 
"In summary we note that the expansion of 
government enterprise with its ever-increasing 
number of employees marks this area of the law 
a crucial one. As the number of persons employed 
by government and governmentally-assisted institu-
tions continues to grow the necessity of preserving 
for them the maximum practicable right to partici· 
pate in the political life of the republic grows with 
it. Restrictions on public employees which, in some 
or all of their applications, advance no compelling 
public interest commensurate with the waiver of 
constitutional rights which they require, imperil the 
continued op~ration of our institutions of represen· 
tative government. * * *" 
And at page 414: 
"* * * Just as we have rejected the fallac· 
ious argument that the power of government to 
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impose such conditions knows no limits, so must we 
acknowledge that government may, when circum-
stances inexorably so require, impose conjitions 
upon the enjoyment of publicly-conferred benefits 
despite a resulting qualification of rights. 
"In doing so, however, go'uernment bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating the practical neces-
sity for the limitation. At the very least it must 
establish that the imposed conditions relate to the 
purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit 
or privilege * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
Appellants submit that the Bagley case i~ sound, basic, 
critical contemporary law. Basically, Bagley's thrust is 
that "only a 'compelling' public interest can justify the im-
position of restraints upon the political activities of public 
employees * * *" ( 421 P. 2d 409, 411) and the Court 
gives, Appellants submit, irrefutable argument in support 
of that thesis. Rather than attempt summary or precis 
of Bagley or burden this brief with extensive quotations 
from the opinion, Appellants respectfully urge this Court 
to examine the entire opinion and the exhaustive citations 
therein. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in the 1967 case of 
De Stefano vs. Wilson, 233 A. 2d 682 in striking down a 
regulation very similar to that at bar and where the plain-
tiff was a fireman (as are certain of the appellants herein) 
cited and quoted Bagley with approval and observed (ait 
687): 
"Rule 128 exacts a surrender of frieedoms unre-
lated to the public welfare or common weal. It 
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bears no reasonable relation to the promotion ot 
efficiency, integrity or discipline within the Ho. 
boken Fire Department." 
The United States Supreme Court in Keyishian vs. 
Bd. of Regents of University of N. Y., supra, ( 1967), hela 
(at 17 L. Ed. 2d 642) : 
"* * '" the theory that public employment 
which may be denied altogether may be subjected 
to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, 
has been uniformly rejected (citing)." 
CONCLUSION 
This is an era when our courts seem most Jedicated 
to protection and expansion of the constitutional rights of 
persons accused of crime - and rightly so. Cerrtainly, 
however, our courts should be at least equally concerned 
with the constitutional rights of our fine, dedicated, law-
abiding citizens who are employed by government. The 
Cirty simply had no right and no reason to adopt these or-
dinances and the resultant hardship to its employ€es is 
apparent. 
Appellants are not, as the City will argue, asking this 
Court to either second guess the City Commission or sub-
stitute the collective wisdom of this Court for that of the 
Commissioners. Appellants argue that fundamental human 
rights must be protected and when elected governmental 
officials choose to run roughshod over the rights of gov· 
ernment employees - and as the California Supreme Court 
observed, their number, for good or ill, is large and on the 
13 
increase - this Court must give the Constitution of our 
State and the Constitution of our nation, meaningful ap-
plication. 
If our constitutional guarantees are to mean anything 
at all to law-abiding citizens, they must mean that the City 
cannot - without any justification at all - adopt these 
ordinances which so flagrantly abridge the most basic 
hllman rights and dignity. 
In the interest of justice and preservation of basic 
human rights, these ordinances should be struck down by 
this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAM M. DUNCAN 
319 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Umh 
Attorney for 
Plaintif ls-Appellants 
